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I. INTRODUCTION

Americans commonly know that federal law prohibits
workplace sexual harassment. Many might be surprised to find,
however, that generally courts have not found liability in the case of
the so-called "equal opportunity" harasser.' A simple hypothetical will
explain the nature of this peculiar species of harasser. Suppose Ken
and Carol are both employed at Happyfun, Inc. as manufacturers of
reindeer Christmas ornaments under the direction of their supervisor,
Fred. Fred corners each of them daily and asks, "How about some sex
today?" No doubt he is sexually harassing both Ken and Carol. If they
sue for relief, however, a judge would very likely tell them that
because Fred harasses both a man and a woman there is no sex
"discrimination" and, therefore, Title VII does not provide a remedy
for their grievances.
In 2000, the Seventh Circuit squarely addressed and upheld
this doctrine in Holman v. Indiana,2 a case that has received
considerable attention in academic literature and case reviews for its
stark denial of relief to victims of equal opportunity harassment.3 The
1. Related to "equal opportunity harassment" are the "bisexual harasser" and "bisexual
harassment." The "bisexual harasser" is one who, having harassed members of only one gender,
defends against a Title VII suit on the basis of his bisexuality alone, without arguing that he
actually harassed both genders. "Bisexual harassment," on the other hand, is sexual harassment
by a bisexual person directed towards members of both genders. In contrast, "equal opportunity
harassment" is the creation of a hostile work environment for both genders (which may or may
not involve actual sexual propositions or conduct). This Note primarily addresses equal
opportunity harassment, though it does relate also to bisexual harassment in that its primary
focus is on sexual propositions or conduct.
2.
Discussed infra at Part II.B.3.
3.
Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 405 (7th Cir. 2000). See Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Review
of the Supreme Court's Employment Cases (2000-2001 Term) and Emerging Issues, in CURRENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 85 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, July 26-28, 2001) ("In
Holman ...the court held that harassment did not occur because of sex where a husband and
wife were sexually harassed by the same supervisor." In so holding, the court said: "Title VII
does not cover the 'equal opportunity' or 'bisexual' harasser.., because such a person is not
discriminating on the basis of sex."); Penny N. Kahan & Lori L. Deem, Current Developments in
Employment Law: Sex and Race Harassment Update, in 30TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON
EMPLOYMENT LAW, 1229, 1291-92 (PLI Litigation and Administrative Practice Course Handbook
Series No. HO-0OAP, 2001) ("Holman ...upholding dismissal of complaint by married couple
who claimed that they were both sexually harassed by the same supervisor because plaintiffs
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responses to Holman are divergent, and those who oppose the result
have taken a variety of tacks in arguing against the court's decision.
The larger issue Holman raises has a much longer history than the
4
case itself, and has been a matter of academic debate since the 1970s.
Surely, most judges would not particularly want to deny relief
to victims of equal opportunity harassment. But, while the Supreme
Court has never held that Title VII does not prohibit equal
opportunity harassment, lower courts generally have not found a
proper theory of discrimination on which to base liability for equal
opportunity harassment. This Note provides such a theory. The theory
uses disparate treatment, disparate impact, 5 and expanded standing

could not show that one gender was subjected to a different working environment than the other
gender."); THEODORA R. LEE, 30 TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON EMPLOYMENT LAw 130-31 (PLI
Litigation and Administrative Practice Course Handbook Series No. HO-0OAP, 2001); Henry L.
Chambers, Jr., Discrimination,Plain and Simple, 36 TULSA L.J. 557, 574 n.105 (2001) (noting
that Holman interprets Oncale to require differential treatment, not merely sex-based
treatment); Kiren Dosanjh, Calling on Oncale: Federal Courts' Post-Oncale Approach to the
"EvidentiaryRoutes" to DiscriminatoryIntent in Title VII Same-Sex HarassmentClaims, 33 URB.
LAW. 547, 558-59 (2001) (discussing Holman in relation to plaintiffs' use of evidence of
comparative treatment to show discriminatory intent); Nancy Levit, A Different Kind of
Sameness: Beyond Formal Equality and Antisubordination Strategies in Gay Legal Theory, 61
OHIO ST. L.J. 867, 889 (2000) (noting that "several insensitive lower courts have read Oncale" to
require differential treatment between women and men and have denied relief to victims of
equal opportunity sexual harassment); Michael P. Maslanka & Veronica A. Cuadra, Sex
DiscriminationMyths and Truths, 64 TEX. B. J. 148, 149 (2001) (noting that egregious sexual
harassment does not always violate the law thanks to the Holman precedent); Shylah Miles,
Note, Two Wrongs Do Not Make a Defense: Eliminatingthe Equal-Opportunity-HarasserDefense,
76 WASH. L. REV. 603, 604-05 (2001) (arguing that to eliminate the equal opportunity harasser
defense courts should resolve Title VII claims through an analysis individualized to the plaintiff,
rather than comparing the plaintiff to other employees in the same workplace).
4.
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 203 (1979):
[I]f
a sexual condition of employment were imposed equally upon both women and
men by the same employer, the practice would no longer constitute sex discrimination
because it would not be properly based on the gender difference. Title VII, as
interpreted, does not concern itself with abuses of human sexuality, only with
impermissible differential consequences of the gender distinction in employment...
[but that] [a]rguably a sexual requirement placed on a man and a woman would have
a [disparate impact] [;]
Jennifer A. Drobac, The Oncale Opinion: A Pansexual Response, 30 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1269,
1278-79 (1999) (agreeing with courts that have found that equal opportunity harassment
discriminates against both men and women); Margaret S. Stockdale et al., The Sexual
Harrassment of Men: Evidence for a Broader Theory of Sexual Harrassment and Sex
Discrimination, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y L. 630, 630-31, 661 (1999) (exploring psychological
differences between harassment of men and harassment of women and arguing that sexually
harassing men does not cure the discriminatory harm inflicted on female victims).
5.
Disparate treatment occurs where supervisors treat one class of employees differently
than they treat another. For instance, a policy of paying male employees at a higher rate than
female employees would be an example of disparate treatment. In contrast, disparate impact
occurs where a uniform policy affects one class of employees differently from another. For
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concepts to provide a framework for finding sex discrimination in the
full range of equal opportunity harassment cases and eliminate the
equal opportunity exception from Title VII jurisprudence.
Unlike some previously proposed theories, which seek to
fundamentally alter sexual harassment analysis from the traditional
method of analyzing the comparative burdens experienced by male
and female employees to an entirely different method of analysis that
is more easily conducive to providing full protection from sexual
harassment, this Note seeks only to stretch the existing framework in
order to show that it already has the capacity to prohibit equal
opportunity harassment. This Note suggests that by analyzing equal
opportunity harassment through the lens of disparate impact and by
tightly and concretely analyzing the impacts that harassment victims
suffer, courts will tend to find that equal opportunity harassment can
result in qualitatively different disparate burdens on both male and
female victims. In other words, equal opportunity harassment can
harm men in ways that it does not harm women and women in ways
that it does not harm men. Thus, it exposes each to "disadvantageous
terms or conditions of employment to which the other gender is not
6
exposed."
This Note proceeds to outline this theory in five parts. Part I
has sought to explain the issue and to imply its attendant problems.
Part II will provide a basic case history of both hostile environment
sexual harassment and the equal opportunity harassment exception
and will begin to highlight how these cases can allow for closing the
exception. Part III will discuss previous scholarly arguments
regarding the appropriateness of and potential for closing the
exception. Finally, Part IV outlines a new disparate impact theory for
prohibiting equal opportunity sexual harassment.

instance, a uniform hiring exam that women consistently outperform men on would have a
disparate impact on the men.
6.
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. History of Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment as Title VII Sex
Discrimination
1. Title VII Generally
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers
from discriminating "against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."7 As it
relates to sexual harassment, this prohibition can be usefully broken
down into four elements: (1) discrimination in (2) the conditions of
employment (3) because of (4) sex. An employer "discriminates" when
he either treats members of a class of employees differently from
members of another class (disparate treatment) or when an
employment practice has a different effect on members of one class of
8
employees than on members of other classes (disparate impact).
Harassment adversely affects the "conditions" of employment when a
reasonable person of the victim's gender would find the harassment
hostile or abusive.9 "Because" means that "but for" the protected
characteristic, the victim would not have suffered the complained-of
injury. 10 "Sex" means gender, not sexual conduct.'1
7.
42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-2(a)(1) (1964).
8.
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 703(m) (1991) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 20O0e-2(k) (1991)).
9.
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
10. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 262 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[A]
substantive violation [of Title VII] only occurs where consideration of an illegitimate criteria is
the 'but for' cause of an adverse employment action."). The Court explained the "but for" test: "In
determining whether a particular factor was a but-for cause of a given event, we begin by
assuming that the factor was present at the time of the event, and then ask whether, even if that
factor had been absent, the event nevertheless would have transpired in the same way." Id. at
240.
11. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80 ("We have never held that workplace harassment is
automatically discrimination because of sex merely because the words used have sexual content
or connotations. 'The critical issue ... is whether members of one sex are exposed to
disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not
exposed.' ") (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 25) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). In the past there was
confusion over this, largely because of the minimal legislative history regarding the word "sex"
in Title VII. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-64 (1986); Ellison v. Brady,
924 F.2d 872, 875-76 (1991). This lack of guidance was largely because "sex" was added to the list
of protected characteristics in Title VII in a last-ditch effort to stop passage of the Civil Rights
Act in 1964. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 63-64; see also 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964); WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR. AND PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 15 (1995);
Charles R. Calleros, The Meaning of "Sex" Homosexual and Bisexual Harassment under Title
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2. Legal History of Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment
Hostile environment sexual harassment was not firmly
established as a Title VII violation until the Supreme Court's 1986
decision in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson. 12 In Meritor, Ms. Vinson
sued former employer Meritor Savings Bank and her supervisor for
sexual harassment, alleging a violation of Title VII. 13 She contended
that during her four-year term of employment, her supervisor, Mr.
Taylor, had constantly subjected her to sexual harassment.14
According to Vinson, the harassment began during her initial training
when Taylor invited her to dinner and then suggested during the meal
that they have sex. 15 She initially refused, but eventually succumbed
for fear of being fired. 16 Thereafter, Taylor repeatedly demanded sex
from her, usually at the bank, and ultimately had sex with her forty to
fifty times. 17 Some of these sexual episodes were rapes.' 8 Taylor also
fondled her in front of other employees, followed her into the women's
restroom when she went in there alone, and exposed himself to her.19
At trial, the district court found no Title VII liability on the
theory that the relationship was voluntary and had nothing to do with
20
her continued employment, advancement, or promotions at the bank.
On appeal, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia reversed on a hostile environment theory of sexual
harassment. 2' The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve
confusion over whether hostile environment sexual harassment was
actionable under Title VII. 22 The Court held that unwelcome sexual

VII, 20 VT. L. REV. 55, 56-57 (1995); Sandra Levitsky, Note, Footnote 55: Closing the "Bisexual
Defense" Loophole in Title VII Sexual Harassment Cases, 80 MINN. L. REV. 1013, 1014 (1996).
12. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). Previously, only "quid pro quo" sexual harassment was uniformly
recognized as a sexual harassment cause of action. Quid pro quo sexual harassment occurs when
a supervisor/employer makes decisions on raises, promotions, demotions, hiring, firing, etc. based
on an employees' submission to, rejection of, or participation in sex. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(1)
(1995); Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 909 (11th Cir. 1982).
13. Meritor Say. Bank, 477 U.S. at 59.
14. Id. at 60.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 61.
21. Id. at 62-63.
22. Id. at 63.
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advances, requests, and other verbal or physical sexual conduct
constitute prohibited sexual harassment where such conduct has the
purpose or effect of creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work
environment. 23 The Court further clarified that not all conduct
characterizable as harassment affects a term, condition, or privilege of
employment within the meaning of Title VII; actionable conduct must
be sufficiently severe or pervasive "to alter the conditions of [the
24
victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment."
Subsequent interpretation of the Court's holding in Meritor
crystallized the elements of the hostile environment cause of action. A
plaintiff must prove: (1) that she was subjected to unwelcome sexual
harassment, (2) that the harassment was based on sex, and (3) that
the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an
abusive work environment, altering the terms or conditions of
25
employment.
Seven years later, the Court defined when harassment is
sufficiently severe or pervasive to abusively alter the victim's
conditions of employment in Harris v. Forklift Systems, holding that
harassing conduct disadvantageously alters the victim's conditions of
employment if a reasonableperson subjected to the harassment would
perceive it as hostile or abusive. 26 Before Harris there was some
confusion as to how much abuse was required to affect a victim's
conditions of employment; the Court adopted the reasonable person
standard to resolve the following facts. 27 Ms. Harris worked as a
manager at Forklift Systems, Inc. 28 She alleged that Forklift's

President, Mr. Hardy, harassed her by calling her a "dumb ass
woman" and telling her several times in the presence of other
employees, 'You're a woman, what do you know" and "We need a man
as the rental manager. ' 29 He publicly suggested that they go to the

23. Id. at 65 (quoting 29 CFR §§ 1604.11(a), (a)(3) (1985)).
24. Id. at 67.
25. Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 1557 (11th Cir. 1987). Technically,
the plaintiff must also prove membership in a protected class, but since both the male and
female genders are now protected classes, there is effectively nothing to prove in that context. Id.
See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).

26. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993). The Court also held that a victim
must subjectively perceive the harassment as hostile or abusive. Id. at 21-22. Practically
speaking, however, it seems very unlikely that such a requirement would ever affect a plaintiff
who makes the effort to sue.
27. Id. at 20.
28. Id. at 19.
29. Id.
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Holiday Inn "to negotiate [her] raise." 30 He also forced Harris and
other female employees to pull coins from his pants pockets, threw
objects on the ground and made them pick them up, and made sexual
innuendos about their clothing. 31 In one instance, when Harris was
dealing with a customer, Hardy publicly asked her, "What did you do,
promise the guy ... some [sex] Saturday night?" 32 Harris sued,
alleging that the sexual harassment violated her Title VII rights. At
trial, the district court found that although this array of harassment
would offend the reasonable woman and that it was a "close case," it
was not sufficiently abusive to violate Title VII because Hardy had not
seriously damaged Harris' psychological well-being. 33 The Sixth
Circuit affirmed in a brief unpublished opinion. 34 The Supreme Court
reversed, however, finding that tangible psychological harm is not
necessary for Title VII liability and that the appropriate standard is
whether a reasonable person would consider the harassment hostile or
abusive. 35 The Court emphasized that the "mere utterance of an...
epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee" would not
suffice. 36 The Court further characterized its decision as taking a
middle path between making "merely offensive" conduct actionable
37
and requiring a tangible psychological injury.
The Harris Court's "reasonable person" is a gender-specific
reasonable person who evaluates the offensiveness of conduct from the
perspective of a reasonable member of the plaintiffs gender. For
example, this means that when a female victim alleges sexual
harassment, a court asks, "Would a reasonable woman experience the
complained-of conduct as hostile or abusive?" While Harris itself did
not specifically address whether the reasonable person is genderspecific, 38 a number of factors indicate that this is implicit. First,
many circuits added gender-specific meaning to the reasonable person
standard before Harris was decided. In Ellison v. Brady, the Ninth
Circuit adopted the "reasonable woman" standard because of concerns
that a gender-neutral reasonable person standard tends to be male-

30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 20.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 22 ("[T]itle VII comes into play before the harassing conduct leads to a nervous
breakdown.").
36. Id. at 20-21.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 20-23.
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biased and could reinforce current male-biased notions of acceptable

conduct. 39 Prior to the Ninth Circuit, the First, 40 Third, 41 Sixth, 42 and
Seventh Circuits, 43 in addition to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC"), 44 had already adopted the gender-specific
reasonable person standard. Moreover, courts continued to use a
gender-specific reasonable person standard after Harris.45 Further,
the Harris Court was directly confronted with the gender-specific
reasonable person standard and did not deny its validity. 46 The
district court in Harris applied the gender-specific reasonable person
standard, finding that Harris' supervisor's conduct would offend the
reasonable woman, but that he was not liable because she did not
suffer tangible psychological harm. 47 In analyzing the district court's
reasoning, the Supreme Court only found error regarding the district
court's requirement of tangible psychological injury in order to find a
Title VII violation. 48 The Court did not find error in the district court's
application of the "reasonable woman" test, nor did the Court discuss
any difference between "reasonable person" and "reasonable
woman." 49 The Court's silence on this issue when faced with it as part
of the district court's opinion, in the wake of widespread adoption by
many circuit courts and the EEOC, suggests assent to the use of the
reasonable woman standard. Finally, regardless of how one interprets
39. 924 F.2d 872, 878-81 (9th Cir. 1991):
In evaluating the severity and pervasiveness of sexual harassment, we should focus
on the perspective of the reasonable victim. If we only examined whether a reasonable
person would engage in allegedly harassing conduct, we would run the risk of
reinforcing the prevailing level of discrimination. Harassers could continue to harass
merely because a particular discriminatory practice was common, and victims of
harassment would have no remedy ...[wie believe that a sex-blind reasonable person
standard tends to be male-biased and tends to systematically ignore the experiences
of women.
40. Lipsett v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 898 (1st Cir. 1988) ("A male supervisor
might believe, for example, that it is legitimate for him to tell a female subordinate that she has
a 'great figure' or 'nice legs.' The female subordinate, however, may find such comments
offensive.").
41. Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3rd Cir. 1990) (sexual
harassment must detrimentally affect a reasonable person of the same sex as the victim).
42. Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 (6th Cir. 1987) (adopting the "reasonable
woman" standard).
43. King v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 898 F.2d 533, 537 (7th Cir. 1990).
44. EEOC Compliance Manual § 615,
3112, C at 3242 (1988) (noting that courts "should
consider the victim's perspective and not stereotyped notions of acceptable behavior").
45. Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1463 (9th Cir. 1994).
46. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 20 (1993).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 22.
49. Id.
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Harris, when the Supreme Court recently ruled on same-sex sexual
harassment in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, it
characterized the reasonable person as having the plaintiffs
perspective in light of "all the circumstances. 5 0 Because the plaintiffs
gender is one of the circumstances to be considered, Oncale seems to
require that the reasonable person share the plaintiffs gender.
The Supreme Court resolved a major aspect of sexual
harassment jurisprudence in Oncale, holding that same-sex sexual
harassment can constitute Title VII sex discrimination. 51 Joseph
Oncale worked as a roustabout for Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,
on an oil platform as a member of an eight-man crew. 52 Three
members of the crew, John Lyons, Danny Pippen, and Brandon
Johnson, forcibly subjected Oncale to sex-related, humiliating actions
in the presence of the rest of the crew. 53 In one instance, Pippen and
Johnson restrained Oncale while Lyons placed his penis on Oncale's
neck, and on another occasion, Lyons placed his penis on Oncale's
arm. 54 Pippen and Lyons physically assaulted Oncale in a sexual
manner and Lyons threatened him with rape. 55 When Oncale
complained to Sundowner's Safety Compliance Clerk, Valent Hohen,
Hohen told Oncale that Lyons and Pippen "picked [on] [Hohen] all the
time too, and called him a [faggot]. 56
The district court granted summary judgment to Sundowner,
reasoning that under Fifth Circuit precedent, Title VII was not
considered to prohibit same-sex harassment.5 7 The circuit court
affirmed the district court's decision. 58 The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that same-sex harassment can violate Title VII.5 9 Finding that
Oncale had a legitimate claim against Sundowner, Justice Scalia's
majority opinion stated, "[W]e hold today that nothing in Title VII
necessarily bars a claim of discrimination 'because of ...sex' merely

50. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).
51. Id. at 82.
52. Id. at 77.
53. Id.
54. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 118 (5th Cir. 1996).
55. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 77.
56. Id. It is ambiguous from the Court's recitation of the facts whether Hohen was called
this name suggesting homosexuality or whether he called Oncale a name suggesting

homosexuality. It seems, however, that in this context it is more likely that Hohen was called the
"name." In either case, it is clear that the aggressors were probably homophobes.
57. Id. at 77.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 79 ("We see no justification in the statutory language or our precedents for a
categorical rule excluding same-sex harassment claims from the coverage of Title VIL.").
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because the plaintiff and the defendant ... are of the same sex."60
Justice Scalia went on to clarify that "[t]he critical issue, Title VII's
text indicates, is whether members of one sex are exposed to
disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which
members of the other sex are not exposed." 61
B. History of the Equal Opportunity HarasserException
1. Pre-MeritorCases Indicating that Equal Opportunity Harassment
Does Not Violate Title VII
The equal opportunity harasser's exemption from Title VII
liability has early origins in Title VII jurisprudence. The issue came
up repeatedly, though entirely in dicta, during the formative period of
sexual harassment jurisprudence. 62 First, in Barnes v. Costle, Judge
Robinson distinguished the situation of an employer who sexually
harasses members of one gender, which that court found to be
actionable, from that of the bisexual employer making "egalitarian"
sexual demands. 63 In pure dicta, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia stated, "In the case of the bisexual superior, the
insistence upon sexual favors would not, constitute gender
discrimination because it would apply to male and female employees
alike. '64 It should be noted that the Barnes court did not involve
bisexual harassment at all. Rather, Ms. Barnes alleged that her
supervisor, Mr. Costle, repeatedly asked her out, repeatedly made
sexual remarks to her, and repeatedly suggested to her that if she had
a sexual affair with him her employment status would be enhanced. 65
Thus, Judge Robinson's dicta regarding the legality of bisexual
harassment was pure speculation with little relevance to the
resolution of the case before the court.
The D.C. Circuit reiterated Judge Robinson's bisexual
harassment exception in Bundy v. Jackson when the court articulated
the following but-for test for sexual discrimination: "[W]ould the
complaining employee have suffered the harassment had he or she
60. Id. at 79.
61. Id. at 80.
62. Vinson v. Taylor, 760 F.2d 1330, 1332-33 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting); Henson
v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 n.7 (D.C. Cir.
1981); Barnes v, Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
63. 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 985.
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been of a different gender?" 66 The court indicated, in dicta, that sexual
harassment would be sex discrimination except in the case of a
"reductio ad absurdum ... where a bisexual supervisor harasses men
and women alike. '67 In that case, the plaintiff, Ms. Bundy claimed
that supervisors Burton, Gainey, and Swain had all made repeated
sexual overtures to her; Swain even told her, "[A]ny man in his right
mind would want to rape you." 68 The Bundy court found that this

male-on-female sexual harassment constituted sex discrimination in
violation of Title VII. Because there was no bisexual harassment at
issue in the case, the court's dicta excepting bisexual harassment from
liability should be treated as mere theoretical speculation.
A few years later in Vinson v. Taylor, Judge Bork took reductio
ad absurdum69 literally, arguing in his dissent that because the
bisexual harasser would escape Title VII liability, Congress must have
intended no prohibition on sexual harassment whatsoever under Title
VII.70 Bork argued that if Title VII bars sexual harassment, then it is

absurd for the statute to not apply in the case of the equal opportunity
harasser-because the harasser would escape liability simply by
virtue of harassing more-and that, therefore, because it results in
this absurd corollary, the proposition that sexual harassment violates
71
Title VII must be false.
In Henson v. Dundee, the Eleventh Circuit joined the D.C.
Circuit in finding that hostile environment sexual harassment can
66. 641 F.2d 934, 942 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 940.
69. A reductio ad absurdum, in the strict sense, is a logical tool used to prove the invalidity
of a proposition. To use it, one assumes the truth of the proposition that one believes to be false.
Then, through interaction with the established premises and conclusions, one shows that such an
assumption results in absurdity, and thus, that the proposition in question must be false. For
example, if one begins with the premises "A does not equal C" and "B equals C," then one method
of proving that "A does not equal B" would be to first assume that "A equals B"; then, because "B
equals C," so does "A equal C," except that the beginning premise was "A does not equal C."
Thus, "A equals C" and "A does not equal C," which is absurd because A cannot both equal and
not equal C. Hence, "A does not equal B." Judge Bork's use is not entirely proper. He found that
including sexual harassment in sex discrimination results in absurdity because sexual
harassment is not prohibited if conducted bisexually. Vinson v. Taylor, 760 F.2d 1330, 1332-33
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting) While this may feel absurd, however, it is not logically
absurd; it makes good sense if one believes that Title VII is about discrimination (which all do)
and that bisexual harassment is not discrimination (which most, erroneously, do). Thus, his
conclusion that sex discrimination must not include sex harassment by virtue of reductio ad
absurdum is based on fuzzy reasoning.
70. Id. at 1333 n.7 ("That bizarre result suggests that Congress was not thinking of
individual harassment at all but of discrimination in conditions of employment because of
gender.").
71. Id. at 1331-33.
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constitute sex discrimination, and, as did the D.C. Circuit, arguing in
corresponding dicta that bisexual harassment is excluded from
liability. 72 Ms. Henson alleged that while she was employed as a
dispatcher for the Dundee Police Department, Chief of Police Sellgren
sexually harassed her by subjecting her and the only other female
employee to "numerous harangues of demeaning sexual inquiries and
vulgarities," by repeatedly requesting sex from her, and by preventing
her from attending the police academy because of her refusals to have
sex with him. 73 The Eleventh Circuit held that Henson properly stated
a valid Title VII claim. 74 In resolving the question of whether hostile
environment sexual harassment could violate Title VII, the court
analyzed the issue at length. In so doing, the court indicated that
bisexual harassment would not violate Title VII: 75 "[Where] a
supervisor makes sexual overtures to workers of both sexes or where
the conduct complained of is equally offensive to male and female
''
workers ... the [victims] would have no remedy under Title VII. 76
2. Cases Confronting the Equal Opportunity Harassment Defense
Using Analyses that Restrict its Scope
The Title VII exemption for equal opportunity harassment, to
the extent that it has ever been established as "law," has survived into
the twenty-first century. 77 The Ninth and Eighth Circuits, however,
addressed the first cases that actually involved equal opportunity
harassment, and each analyzed the issue in ways that drastically
restricted the exception's scope. 78 In Steiner v. Showboat Operating
Company, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied applicability of
the defense. 79 In Steiner, Ms. Steiner, a floor person for a Showboat
casino, sued Showboat alleging that her supervisor, Trenkle, had
72. 682 F.2d 897, 901-02, 904 (lth Cir. 1982).
73. Id. at 899-900.
74. Id. at 901-02.
75. Id. at 901-904.
76. Id. at 904.
77. Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 402-07 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that as a matter of law
neither of the plaintiffs has a claim for discrimination under Title VII where the complaint states
that their supervisor sexually harassed both female and male plaintiffs in the same sexual
manner); Pasqua v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 101 F.3d 514, 517 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Harassment that is
inflicted without regard to gender, that is, where males and females in the same setting do not
receive disparate treatment, is not actionable because the harassment is not based on sex.").
78. Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459 (9th Cir. 1994); Kopp v. Samaritan
Health Sys., Inc., 13 F.3d 264 (8th Cir. 1993); Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp., 826 F. Supp.
1334 (D. Wyo. 1993).
79. Steiner, 25 F.3d at 1464.
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abusively harassed her.8 0 According to Steiner, Trenkle frequently
called her offensive names such as "dumb fucking broad," "cunt," and
"fucking cunt."' On one occasion, when he disagreed with her choice
to "comp" a breakfast for two blackjack players, he publicly asked,
"Why don't you go in the restaurant and suck their dicks while you are
82
at it if you want to comp them so bad?"
Showboat defended itself by showing that Trenkle abused both
male and female employees, arguing that this proved that he had not
discriminated because of sex.8 3 The district court agreed and granted
summary judgment in favor of Showboat.8 4 The Ninth Circuit
reversed, however, finding that Trenkle discriminated by abusing
women in a gender-based way, while he abused men in a genderneutral way.8 5 For instance, while he called men "assholes," he called
women "dumb fucking broads."8 6 By harassing female employees
differently from male employees, he had discriminated by sex and was
87
therefore liable.
Perhaps the boldest disparate treatment analysis of an equal
opportunity harassment defense was in the U.S. District Court for the
88
District of Wyoming in the case of Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp.
The facts of Chiapuzio are as follows: Dale and Carla Chiapuzio
("Dale" and "Carla"), Clint Bean ("Bean"), and Christina Vironet
("Vironet") were employees of the Wyoming Technical Institute
("WTI"). 8 9 Eddie Bell ("Bell") supervised them. 90 Bell repeatedly
asserted to both Dale and Carla that he could make love to Carla
better than Dale could. 91 Bell also publicly subjected Bean and his wife
80. Id. at 1461.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1463.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1463-64.
86. Id. at 1464.
87. Id. The court further opined that "although words from a man to a man are differently
received than words from a man to a woman, we do not rule out the possibility that both men
and women working at Showboat have viable claims against [defendant] for sexual harassment."
Id. One can infer that if the court had actually been presented with both male and female
plaintiffs, it would have reasoned that treating women differently from men necessarily implies
that men are treated differently from women, and therefore, that Trenkle had discriminated in
his treatment of men as well. See id.
88. 826 F. Supp. 1334, 1336-38 (D. Wyo. 1993).
89. Id. at 1335. WTI is a trade school that was owned and operated by the defendant BLT
Operating Corp. ("BLT"). Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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to constant sexually abusive remarks, once offering Bean's wife $100
to sit on his lap. 92 Finally, Bell made repeated sexual advances on
93
Vironet, a receptionist at WTI.
The Chiapuzios, Bean, and Vironet all sued BLT for sexual
harassment under Title VII. At trial, BLT argued that because Bell
harassed both male and female employees he did not discriminate
based on sex. 94 The court, unimpressed with the general argument
that equal harassment is not gender-based, 95 rejected this equal
opportunity harassment defense, 96 finding that in this case, Bell's
remarks were gender-driven. 97 His harassment demeaned Dale and
Bean as not being "man enough" for their wives. 98 In contrast, when
Bell harassed Vironet, Carla, and Bean's wife he typically described
graphic sexual acts that he would like to perform with them. 99 Though
Bell was an equal opportunity harasser, "[t]he nature of [his] remarks
indicate[d] that he harassed the plaintiffs because of their gender." 100
The court found discrimination by analyzing how Bell had harassed
each plaintiff and determined that he had harassed males and females
differently.101
In Kopp v. Samaritan Health System, Inc., the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals narrowed the equal harassment defense by analyzing
whether one gender was harassed more severely than the other. 10 2 In
that case, Ms. Kopp, a hospital employee, alleged that Dr. Albaghdadi
had abused her because she was a woman. 0 3 On two occasions, he
shouted at her, once throwing his stethoscope at her because another
doctor had transferred a patient before Albaghdadi could collect his

92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1337. The court argued that "[w]here a harasser violates both men and women, 'it
is not unthinkable to argue that each individual who is harassed is being treated badly because
of gender.' " Id. (quoting John J. Donahue, Advocacy Versus Analysis in Assessing Employment
DiscriminationLaw, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1583, 1610-11 (1992)).

96. Chiapuzio, 826 F. Supp. at 1336-38.
97. Id. at 1337.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1338.
100. Id. at 1337-38 (emphasis added).
101. Id. The court offered a further argument in favor of this finding: efficiency. Id. at 1338.
Reasoning that the plaintiffs could succeed if they brought their suits individually by showing
that the general work atmosphere was sexually hostile, it found that barring a group lawsuit
would create an inefficient and pointless result. Id.
102. 13 F.3d 264, 269-70 (8th Cir. 1993).
103. Id. at 266.
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fee. 104 On another occasion, an echocardiogram report was missing
and Albaghadadi telephoned Kopp to demand that she tell him where
the report was. 105 When she did not know, he said that the female
head of Samaritan's medical records department was a "stupid
bitch. ' 10 6 When he encountered Kopp in the hallway fifteen minutes
later, and she still could not provide him with a firm answer, he
grabbed her, gripping her bra straps and skin, pulled her close and
shouted, "I want to know who to come after when this happens
again." 10 7 Albaghdadi also abused other female Samaritan
employees.108 He threatened one, attacked another with charged
defibrillator paddles, called one a "fat bitch," told another to get her
"tits" out of the way while attending to patients, threw a patient chart
at another, and told another that she was "a piece of shit" and that he
wanted to "beat the shit out of [her]."109

Samaritan asserted an affirmative defense that Albaghdadi
had also abused male employees. 110 Specifically, he swore at one for
being too slow, raised his voice at another when he met to discuss the
Kopp incident, swore at another for canceling a test Albaghdadi had
ordered, and called another a "goddamn bastard" during the Kopp
incident.111 The district court agreed that this proved that Albaghdadi
had not discriminated based on sex. 112 On appeal, however, the Eighth
Circuit reversed, finding that Albaghdadi harassed female employees
more frequently and with more severity than he harassed their male
counterparts. 3 The record showed that Albaghdadi had harassed
females on ten occasions whereas he had harassed males on only four
occasions. 114 Also, several times he abused women with actual physical
contact and harm, whereas he abused men only with a raised voice or
a verbal insult. 15 Thus, the court reasoned that even though the
environment may have been abusive for all employees, it was more

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 267-68.
at 268.
at 265.
at 269.
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abusive for female employees, and so, Albaghdadi had discriminated
116
on the basis of gender.
More recent cases have indicated a policy concern with
11 7
allowing an equal opportunity harasser to escape liability.
Essentially, it seems counter-intuitive that an employer is liable for
sexually harassing some employees, but not liable for sexually
harassing all employees.11 8 As is clear in light of Oncale, however, this
policy concern is insufficient to support extending liability to equal
opportunity harassers under a statute designed to combat
discrimination." 9 Without articulating how equal opportunity
harassment discriminates by sex, it appears quite clear that no Title
VII liability exists for the bona fide equal opportunity harasser.120
3. The Most Recent Case: Holman v. Indianaand its Flaws
The Seventh Circuit recently reached this same conclusion in
Holman v. Indiana, the first and only case to actually hold that the
equal opportunity harasser is not liable for sexual discrimination
under Title VII.121 The alleged facts are as follows. Steven and Karen
Holman ("Steven" and "Karen"), a married couple, both worked at the
Indiana Department of Transportation ("IDOT").122 They alleged that
Karen's foreman, Gale Uhrich ("Uhrich"), began sexually harassing
her in 1995 by "touching her body, standing too closely to her, asking
her to go to bed with him and making sexist comments.' 1 23 They also

116. See id.
117. See McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 260 (7th Cir. 1996). "It would be exceedingly
perverse if a male worker could buy his supervisors and his company immunity from Title VII
liability by taking care to harass sexually an occasional male worker, though his preferred
targets were female." Id. at 260; see also Doe v. Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 590 (7th Cir. 1997)
(citing similar concerns).
118. McDonnell, 84 F.3d at 260.
119. Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 404 (7th Cir. 2000). '"We do not think.., that it is
anomalous for a Title VII remedy to be precluded when both sexes are treated badly. Title VII is
predicated on discrimination ... requiring disparate treatment is consistent with the statute's
purpose of preventing such treatment." Id.; see also Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc.,
523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998) (noting that Title VII "evinces a congressional intent to strike at the entire
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in employment.").
120. For the purposes of this Note, the "bona fide" equal opportunity harasser is one that
harasses on a purely even-handed basis, not differentiating by gender in his treatment of targets
at all.
121. Holman, 211 F.3d at 404.
122. Id. at 401.
123. Id.
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alleged that Uhrich had sexually harassed Steven by "grabbing his
1 24
head while asking for sexual favors.'
At trial, IDOT moved to dismiss the Holman's claim under
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure125 for failure to
state a claim. 126 The district court granted the motion and dismissed
the Holmans' complaint, 127 finding that "because both plaintiffs were
alleging sexual harassment by the same supervisor, they both, as a
matter of law, could not prove that the harassment occurred 'because
of sex.' ",128 The Holmahs appealed, but the Seventh Circuit affirmed
the district court's dismissal.129 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that
Title VII liability required discrimination,which in turn required a
showing that "members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous
terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex
are not exposed. ' 130 Hence, the court found, because the Holmans
alleged that each had been sexually harassed, as a matter of law,
neither of them had been subjected to "disadvantageous terms or
conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not
131
exposed."
Ironically, the Holman court's failure was in straying from
Title VII's text, which prohibits sex discrimination, and focusing too
much on the joint allegation of "sexual harassment." To analyze the
court's reasoning, this Note will refer to the offensive conduct
allegedly suffered by Steven as "X," and the offensive conduct
allegedly suffered by Karen as '."
As discussed previously, X is
foreman Uhrich asking Steven for sexual favors while grabbing his
head.' 32 Y is foreman Uhrich touching Karen's body, standing too
closely to her, asking her to go to bed with him, and making sexist

124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Essentially, this means that if all facts alleged by the plaintiffs are taken to be true, and
such facts do not constitute a valid cause of action, then the complaint is dismissed. See id. at
402. A complaint will be dismissed if "it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of
facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467
U.S. 69, 73 (1984).
127. Holman, 211 F.3d at 401.
128. Holman v. State, 24 F. Supp. 2d 909, 910 (N.D. Ind. 1998).
129. Holman, 211 F.3d at 407.
130. Id. at 403 (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998)).
131. Id. "Title VII does not cover the 'equal opportunity' or 'bisexual' harasser, then, because
such a person is not discriminating on the basis of sex. He is not treating one sex better (or
worse) than the other; he is treating both sexes the same (albeit badly)." Id.
132. Id. at 401.

2002]

"EQUAL OPPORTUNITY" SEXUAL HARASSER

1223

comments. 133 X and Y are clearly different in certain respects: Uhrich
did not grab Karen's head, 3 4 Uhrich did not make sexist remarks to
Steven.135 The Seventh Circuit, however, unconsciously and
inductively converted these distinct sets of alleged facts X and Y into
"Z," i.e. "sexual harassment." Hence, the court reasoned that because
Karen alleged Z, and because Steven alleged Z, then they had not been
treated differently; thus, there was no discrimination because of
sex. 136 By inductively converting X and Y into Z and Z, however, the
court obfuscated the differences between X and Y and failed to adhere
to Title VII's clear mandate that an employer may not discriminate, or
treat employees differently, on the basis of sex. 137 Karen and Steven
were treated differently, and the nature of the differences suggests
that they were treated differently "because of... sex." The 1991 Civil
Rights Act, which amended the 1964 Civil Rights Act, specifically
provides that disparate treatment is discrimination by sex if the
plaintiff(s) can show that sex was a "motivating factor" for the
difference. 138 Thus, as long as the Holmans could prove that Uhrich's
choice to headlock Steve was motivated in part by Steve's maleness
and that his choice to make misogynist comments to Karen was
motivated in part by her femaleness, then they would have sufficiently
shown discrimination by sex.
One might object that this concrete analysis seizes on minutiae
to show discrimination when few would normally recognize its
existence. But, while it may be true that on first glance few would see
discrimination in Uhrich's treatment of the Holman's, the fact remains
that he disparately treated Steve and Karen Holman. Title VII is
intended "to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of
men and women in employment."' 39 Moreover, there is no danger that
close attention to concrete differences in treatment would lead to an
absurd "flood" of Title VII suits because a plaintiff must always prove
133. Id. While the complaint also alleged that Uhrich had "sexually harassed" both Karen
and Steve, such an allegation is not so much a fact as a legal conclusion, and thus, a more proper
point of analysis is to consider the actual facts alleged.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See id. at 402-04.
137. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1964).
138. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2001). "[Aln unlawful employment
practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors
also motivated the practice." Id.
139. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998) (quoting Meritor Sav.
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986)) (emphasis added).

1224

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:1205

that the disparate treatment was motivated in part by sex, and, even
more importantly, that the disparate treatment was sufficiently
abusive to alter his or her conditions of employment. Under this
reasoning, the Holmans still may have lost on the ground that, taken
alone, neither headlocks nor misogynist comments are objectively
offensive enough to render Steven's or Karen's employment conditions
"hostile." The other aspects of Uhrich's harassment would not be
considered in this abusiveness analysis because he did not treat
Steven and Karen differently with regard to those other aspects. If
Uhrich's headlocks and sexist comments were sufficiently severe or
pervasive, however, then one or both of the Holmans still might have
won; in any event, this would be a question of fact for the jury. The
Holman court should have accounted for the real differences in the
way that Uhrich treated Karen and Steven, and thus, it should have
decided the case based on whether the disparate treatment was
sufficiently hostile, rather than on a supposed lack of

discrimination. 140
The courts' reasoning in Showboat, Chiapuzio, and Kopp is
more faithful to the dictates of Title VII than is that of the Holman
court. Title VII forbids employers from treating members of one sex
differently from members of the other sex when such disparate
treatment is motivated, in part, by sex. 4 1 Again, this is intended to
strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment. 142 Because
"sexual harassment" is essentially a mere label for a certain category
of Title VII violations, the fact that both male and female employees
allege facts that can be characterized as "sexual harassment" should
not obfuscate gender-based differences in the actual alleged harassing
conduct. Therefore, victims of an employer who abuses men and
women in different ways generally should be able to sue, as long as
they can show that the difference in treatment amounted to a
disadvantageous condition of employment and was motivated by the
victims' genders.
While this analysis effectively eliminates the equal opportunity
harasser exception for situations in which an employer abuses men
and women differently, it does not resolve the situation where an
employer subjects men and women to exactly the same abuse. Thus,

140. This Note's analysis of Holman is essentially an application of Chiapuzio's reasoning.
The author can ascertain no inconsistencies with Title VII in this method of closely analyzing
harassment to determine whether there has been disparate treatment.
141. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 703(m) (1991).
142. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 78 (quoting Meritor Say. Bank, 477 U.S. at 64) (emphasis added).
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this Note's introductory hypothetical, in which Supervisor Fred
repeatedly asked both Ken and Carol "How about some sex today?"
would not be resolved by disparate treatment analysis. This Note's
central thesis, presented in Part IV, will endeavor to show Fred's
liability.
III. SCHOLARLY PERSPECTIVES ON EQUAL OPPORTUNITY HARASSMENT

Professor Charles Calleros addressed equal opportunity
harassment in "The Meaning of 'Sex': Homosexual and Bisexual
Harassment Under Title VII", in which he expressed agreement with
those courts that deny Title VII liability for equal opportunity
harassers. 143 He did, however, acknowledge that one could logically
consider the same conduct directed at members of both genders to be
144
sex discrimination by "taking compartmentalization to an extreme."
Compartmentalization of qualitatively different burdens for separate
analysis is a routine practice in Title VII cases. 145 For instance, if a
female employee sues for sexual harassment sex discrimination, an
employer could not defend himself by showing that he requires male
employees to work more physically strenuous jobs.1 46 This
compartmentalization principle was implicitly recognized in Oncale:
"The critical issue, Title VII's text indicates, is whether members of
one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of
employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed." 147 In
the Oncale Court's evaluation of "the critical issue," there is no
mention of whether there are different disadvantageous "offsetting"
terms or conditions of employment that "equalize" the overall working
conditions. The only issue in the text is whether, in the context of a
particular disadvantageous term or condition, members of one sex are
exposed and members of the other are not. Therefore, by clear
implication,
if an
employer's
treatment
inflicts
different
disadvantageous conditions of employment on men than on women,
both male and female victims have a right to sue for the injury that
they sustained from the particular disadvantageous condition of
employment affecting them personally. Thus, in the example described

143. Calleros, supra note 11, at 79.
144. Id. at 77.
145. Id. at 71 ("[Courts] routinely compartmentalize allegedly discriminatory practices,
isolating a particular kind of objectionable policy or practice for analysis.").
146. See id.
147. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring)).
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above, wherein females are sexually harassed and males are made to
perform more strenuous labor, both males and females could sue
148
(rather than neitherbeing able to sue) for their respective injuries.
Professor
Calleros
acknowledged
that
extreme
compartmentalization shows that equal harassment subjects men and
women to different kinds of harassment.' 49 He noted that male victims
are subjected to unwelcome demands for homosexual sex, a form of
harassment "that might be unsettling to homophobic men in a way
that is psychologically different, though not necessarily more intense,
[than] the pain and stress visited upon the women as a result of the
supervisor's heterosexual advances toward them. '' 50 He concluded,
however, that such analysis extends compartmentalization too far,
suggesting that a similar claim could be made of generalized layoffs
because men, socialized as "breadwinners," suffer more from losing
5
their jobs than women do.' 1
Professor Calleros may be correct that analyzing the disparate
impacts of a layoff from the employees' perspectives could show that
men suffer disadvantageously in a different way than women do when
laid off. Even so, this argument fails to rebut the propriety of using
disparate impact analysis in equal opportunity harassment cases
because Calleros's hypothetical amounts to the (potential) imposition
of disadvantageous conditions of unemployment not suffered by the
other sex. Title VII clearly does not obligate employers to concern
1 52
themselves with former employees' conditions of unemployment.
Moreover, one may presume that such layoffs would usually be
"consistent with business necessity."'153 Thus, his example fails as a
reductio ad absurdum for the role that compartmentalized disparate
impact analysis might usefully play in sexual harassment cases.
Indeed, sexual harassment seems to be a particularly apt example in
which compartmentalized disparate impact analysis would be
applicable because, unlike generalized wage reductions, layoffs, etc.,
sexual harassment is presumably never "consistent with business
necessity."

148. The Supreme Court recognized the concept of simultaneous discrimination in Wengler
v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 142 (1980) (finding that a single policy can
simultaneously discriminate against both men and women).
149. Calleros, supra note 11, at 77.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1964).
153. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq. (1991).
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In a recently published student article, Dawn Macready argued
that the equal opportunity harassment exception is an example of
judges using restrictive statutory construction in an effort to restrain
the size and influence of government and not because it accords with
statutory purposes. 154 She argued that the equal opportunity
harassment exception frustrates Title VII's purpose of protecting
equality in the workplace and that the statutory language, "because
of... sex," is ambiguous enough to be interpreted to prohibit equal
opportunity harassment. 155 For instance, while "sex" has been
interpreted to refer only to the male-female distinction, it could be
interpreted more broadly also to refer to sexuality, sexual conduct, or
sexual impulses. 156 Under that interpretation, the fact that a
supervisor harasses members of both genders would be irrelevant to
his liability because he would be singling out employees for
harassment "because of " his sexual desire for them. Macready also
suggested that this expanded interpretation of "sex" is unnecessary
since courts could simply follow the reasoning developed in
Chiapuzio157 to argue that when harassers harass men in a different
158
way than they harass women, they are discriminating based on sex.
Thus, Macready found that the- equal, opportunity harassment
exception could be eliminated via either of these routes, that the
exception is "absurd on its face," that Title VII's purpose of providing
an egalitarian workplace mandates its elimination, and therefore, that
the issue is an example of recalcitrant courts using their statutory
159
construction power to rein in the federal government's influence.
While this Note joins in Macready's support for the Chiapuzio
reasoning, 6 0 her argument that courts ought to interpret "sex" as
meaning both gender and sexual conduct rings a little hollow. She is
not without support, 16' but not only has -this interpretation been
definitively denied 162 it is also a little silly. True, "sex" can mean
sexual conduct. But "race" can mean racing conduct, perhaps running
or swimming. "Age" can mean aging conduct, perhaps smoking or
154. Dawn Macready, Note, Statutory Construction as a Means of Judicial Restraint on
Government: A Case Study in Bisexual Harassment under Title VII, 27 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 659,
676 (2001).
155. Id. at 675.
156. Id.
157. Discussed infra at Part II.B.2.
158. Macready, supra note 154, at 672-74.
159. Id. at 675-76.
160. Id. at 672-74.
161. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 875-76 (9th Cir. 1991).
162. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
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tanning. The Author can not imagine Macready seriously arguing
that Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against
running marathons.
It seems fairly obvious that the protected
characteristics listed in Title VII are just that; protected
characteristics, not activities. Thus, this Note concurs with the
Supreme Court's determination that harassing workplace sexual
conduct does not automatically satisfy Title VII's "because of ... sex"
63
requirement.1
In The Sexual Harassment of Men: Evidence for a Broader
Theory of Sexual Harassment and Sex Discrimination,psychologists
Margaret Stockdale, Michelle Visio, and Leena Batra built on
Katherine Franke's 1997 Stanford Law Review Article, 164 which
criticized existing theory on sexual harassment's relationship to sex
discrimination and created a new theory that adequately accounts for
atypical forms of harassment, such as same sex and equal opportunity
65
harassment.1
The psychologists argued that sexual harassment constitutes
sex discrimination when "the conduct is being used to enforce or
perpetuate 'hypergender' norms and stereotypes."'1 66 The authors
further explained, "Hypergender norms are composed of both
hypermasculinity (a rigid male sex-role stereotyped identity composed
of calloused sex attitudes toward women, a conception of violence as
manly, and a view of danger as exciting) and hyperfeminity (a rigid
female sex-role stereotype identity that women are viewed as sexual
objects)."'16 7 They found that this understanding of sexual
harassment's discriminatory effects would:
Recogn[ize] that (a) sexual harassment reinforces rigid sex-role norms and stereotypes
that subjugate all women and those men who do not conform to heterosexual norms of
masculinity; (b) the harassment of men by other heterosexual men constitutes sex
discrimination because it has the effect of perpetuating hypermasculine and
heterosexist standards16 8 ... (c) bisexual or equal-opportunity harassment constitutes
sex discrimination even though members of both genders are harassed because such an

163. Id.
164. Katherine Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691
(1997).
165. Margaret S. Stockdale et al., The Sexual Harassment of Men Evidence for a Broader
Theory of Sexual Harrassmentand Sex Discrimination,5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POLY & L. 630, 659-61
(1999).
166. Id. at 636.
167. Id. at 636-37.
168. By "heterosexist standards," the authors mean "an ideological system that denies,
denigrates, and stigmatizes any non-heterosexual form of behavior, identity, relationship, or
community." Id. at 637 (quoting G. M. Herek, Heterosexism, Hate Crimes, and the Law, in
VIOLENCE AND THE LAW 89-112 (M. Costanzo & S. Oskamp eds., 1994).
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act can directly subordinate women by conditioning employment benefits on sexual
cooperation or creating a hostile work environment for women, and it can indirectly
subordinate women by harassing men in order to maintain male dominance through
6
hypermasculine ideology. 9

Through empirical psychological research, the psychologists
determined that men harass men in significantly different ways from
how they harass women. 170 Their primary finding was that male-male
harassment typically takes the form of enforcing a hypermasculine
heterosexual gender-role on those men who expose "weakness" or
seem "effeminate."171"[[M]ale on male sexual harassment] often
involves enforcing masculine gender role expectations of strength and
dominance ...[and is usually inflicted on slightly younger, [less
senior, lower paid, non-supervisory personnel]." 172 Thus, their
research implies that the hypothetical "bona fide" equal opportunity
harasser 73 may be nothing more than a fictional character. Indeed, all
of the equal opportunity harassment cases thus far conform to these
psychologists' finding that the male harasser will harass men in a
male-hierarchy-imposing manner, while he harasses women in a
sexually-derogatory and sex-extracting manner. 174 These findings
suggest that the so-called equal opportunity harasser is driven by
different goals when he harasses men than when he harasses women,
and that he imposes different "disadvantageous conditions of
employment"'175 on men than on women. Therefore, the psychologists'
finding directly supports this Note's thesis that equal opportunity
harassment can constitute sex discrimination in violation of Title
VII.176
In April of 2001, Washington Law Review published student
Shylah Miles's piece in which she argued that the equal opportunity
harassment defense should be eliminated by analyzing the "because

169. Id.
170. Id. at 647-56.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 655, 658.
173. The "bona fide" equal opportunity harasser harasses men and women in exactly the
same manner.
174. Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 404 (7th Cir. 2000); Steiner v. Showboat Operating
Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1463-64 (9th Cir. 1994); Kopp v. Samaritan Health Sys., Inc., 13 F.3d 264,
269-70 (8th Cir. 1993); Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1334, 1337-38 (D. Wyo.
1993).
175. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (quoting Harris v.
Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)).
176. Discussed infra at Part IV.
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of... sex" element in sexual harassment claims on an individual
rather than a gender-comparative basis. 177 She claims that:
Analyzing each claim individually will enable courts to deny the equal-opportunityharasser defense. Where a perpetrator harasses both men and women, the traditional
interpretation of the 'because of sex' element prevents plaintiffs from making the
required showing of disparate treatment. Evidence of disparate treatment, however,
does not exhaust the evidence of discrimination because of sex; individual analysis of the
plaintiffs claim may also expose harassment based on an individual's sex. This analysis
separates plaintiffs' claims and analyzes conduct directed at each plaintiff individually.
If that conduct is motivated by the plaintiffs gender, then the plaintiff has satisfied the
'because of sex' element. By utilizing an individual analysis, courts can deny the equalopportunity-harasser defense, enable sexual harassment law to fulfill its purpose, and
7
avoid absurd results that occur with the traditional disparate-treatment requirement.1 8

Miles's "individual analysis" would require courts to essentially
focus only on each individual plaintiffs claim, ignoring other plaintiffs
from the same workplace or other noncomplaining victims, and look
for evidence that the harassing conduct related to the plaintiffs
gender. 179 Miles stated further, "Because such a nexus may exist
regardless of the [defendant's] conduct toward other employees, a factfinder should be permitted to draw a similar conclusion whenever a
plaintiff presents evidence of conduct related to his or her gender,
notwithstanding conduct related to other employees' genders.
...[E]vidence

of equal-opportunity

harassment

should

not

be

dispositive.' ' 80 For instance, when a supervisor harasses a female
employee with terms such as "cunt" or "broad," the requisite showing
of discrimination can be made because such terms are traditionally
used to denigrate women.181

Additionally, Miles finds support in Oncale for the use of
individualized analysis, arguing that "the Court stated in dicta that a
plaintiff could show discrimination 'because of sex' with three different
types of evidence: (1) comparative evidence, (2) evidence of genderspecific conduct or actions, or (3) evidence of explicit or implicit
proposals of sexual activity." 18 2 Miles argues that the second and third
evidentiary routes "opened the door to an individual analysis of the
'because of sex' element because such evidence concerns conduct
directed toward the individual plaintiff."' 8 3
177. Shylah Miles, Note, Two Wrongs Do Not Make a Defense: Eliminating the Equal-Opportunity
HarasserDefense, 76 WASH. L. REv. 603, 621 (2001).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 623-24.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 624-25.
182. Id. at 628.
183. Id.
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While interesting, Miles's proposal is ultimately unpersuasive.
She has completely lost sight -of Title VII's purpose as an antidiscrimination statute. It is simply nonsensical to make an
"individualized" showing of discrimination because discrimination
fundamentally relates to inequalities between employees; one cannot
show that an employee has experienced inequality if one is unwilling
to relate her experience to that of others. The Oncale Court reiterated
the requirement that members of one gender suffer "disadvantageous
terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other
gender are not exposed." 18 4 Miles's approach entirely evades this
requirement. Thus, Miles' attempt to resolve the equal opportunity
harassment conundrum fails.
In The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, Kenji Yoshino
discussed the bisexual harassment exception and found a number of
potential limits on its scope.18 5 First, he noted that, by and large,
courts do not grant the exemption when a harasser who has harassed
only one gender defends against a suit simply by claiming to "be"
bisexual.18 6 Second, he discussed the "sequential bisexual," one who
alternates between periods of harassing men and periods of harassing
women, and he noted the possible argument that "[e]ven if he
harassed the same numbers of men and women, one could still argue
that at the time he was harassing any individual man, no woman was
in danger, and vice versa."18 7 Finally, he cited Chiapuzio for the theory
that where bisexual harassment occurs in gender-differentiated ways,
there has been discrimination "because of sex."188 He noted that in
Chiapuzio the harasser harassed women in sexual ways and he
harassed men in non-sexual ways, thus providing a difference in the
harassment based on sex. He contends that the logic of this case can
be extended to those cases of sexual harassment of both men and
women where the harassment's sexual content manifested itself in
systematically sex-differentiated ways 189
Yoshino leaves the bisexual harassment defense intact for
those employers who are "genuinely 'sex-blind' such that the sex of the
184. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (quoting Harris v.
Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring))
185. Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REV. 353, 43661 (2000).
186. Id. at 444.
187. Id. (citing Tietgen v. Brown's Westminster Motors, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1495 (E.D. Va.
1996)).
188. Id. at 445-46 (citing Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1334, 1336-38 (D.
Wyo. 1993)).
189. Id. at 446.
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victim [has] no salience for him."190 He seems to be stuck with this
conclusion because of his general approach to this issue, which is,
perhaps, overly focused on the subjective motivations of the harasser
and lacking in regard for the impact on the victims' "conditions of
employment." 191 Title VII's text, and the Oncale court's interpretation
of it, indicate that the critical issue is whether members of one sex
suffer disadvantageous conditions of employment that members of the
other sex do not. Rather than looking exclusively to whether sex has
salience for the harasser, Yoshino ought to have considered the
192
victims' conditions of employment.
In The "Undifferentiating Libido'" A Need For Federal
Legislation to Prohibit Sexual Harassment by a Bisexual Sexual
Harasser,Robin Applebaum argued that:
Technically, Title VII should not provide a remedy to victims of bisexual harassment
because the harasser is treating both sexes alike and therefore, the requisite "but for"
standard can never be satisfied. However, the male supervisor may only sexually harass
one woman, despite working among several. Similarly, in a same-sex sexual harassment
situation, not everyone of the harasser's gender will be harassed. The "but for" standard
is not necessarily "but for" the victim's sex, rather "but for" the employer's sexual
93
attraction to the employee, the employee would not have been harassed.

Applebaum goes on to conclude, however, that including equal
opportunity harassment in Title VII would stretch Title VII "even
further" beyond its original intent. Furthermore, she found that while
sexual harassment, in general, is a bad fit with Title VII's antishould be generally prohibited
discrimination purpose, it
nevertheless. 194 Thus, she proposes that the only viable solution to
resolving the theoretical weaknesses of including sexual harassment
in Title VII, and the troubling gaps in protection flowing from those
weaknesses, such as the lack of prohibition against bisexual
harassment, is new federal legislation that specifically targets sexual
harassment in the workplace. 195 In thus arguing, she follows in

190. Id.
191. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1964).
192. It should be noted that Yoshino's article only tangentially touches on this topic and does
not go to a great effort to make radical analytical moves with it, basically being content to
summarize already proposed limits and discuss their implications. His article's primary focus is
on the visibility of bisexuality in the law, a far broader topic than this statutory construction
issue. Yoshino, supra note 185, at 353.
193. Robin Applebaum, Note, The "UndifferentiatingLibido" A Need for Federal Legislation
to Prohibit Sexual Harassment by a Bisexual Sexual Harasser, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J.
601, 616 (1997) (citing Michelle Ridgeway Pierce, Sexual Harassment and Title VII-A Better
Solution, 30 B.C. L. REV. 1071, 1090 (1989)).
194. Id. at 616.
195. Id. at 621-22.
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Michelle Ridgeway Pierce's footsteps, taking the essential position
that using analytical contortions to fit sexual harassment into sex
discrimination simply rings false and that the better solution is to
pressure Congress to deal with sexual harassment on its face. 196
Applebaum's view is unfounded. Her main argument, that
sexual harassment is "but for" the harasser's sexual attraction rather
than being "but for" the victim's sex, displays a fundamental
misunderstanding of "but for" analysis. True, the harasser's sexual
attraction is generally a sine qua non in sexual harassment cases, but
victim's sex is also a sine qua non. If the victim were of the opposite
sex, the disadvantageous conditions of employment imposed by the
harassment would not have been imposed. Applebaum seems far too
ready to submit to the Borks of the world in this respect. Moreover,
while an anti-harassment statute certainly has its appeal, 197 Congress
does not seem to be terribly anxious to make one. Scholars would
probably do better to work their influence on the existing doctrine
rather than throwing up their hands and asking Congress to get
involved.
In Footnote 55: Closing the "BisexualDefense" Loophole in Title
VII Sexual Harassment Cases,198 Sandra Levitsky uses a Catharine
MacKinnon-style gender dominance approach to argue that bisexual
harassment is sex discrimination because it reinforces traditional
gender norms of male dominance and female submission. 199 She
argues that "[s]exual harassment acts ... both as a penalty for
departing from scripted gender norms and as a method of maintaining
the gender hierarchy." 200 She states further:
In opposite-sex, equal opportunity, and sexual harassment cases in which a homosexual
supervisor harasses an employee of the same sex, the harasser makes the victim feel
like a sex object. Sex objects are usually women. For a woman, feeling like a sex object

196. Id. at 621 (citing Pierce, supra note 193, at 1100). Pierce's argument was very similar:
The new law would have three beneficial effects. First, it would alleviate the
theoretical and analytical problems associated with defining sexual harassment as
'gender discrimination' under Title VII. Second, it would provide a claim for plaintiffs
where Title VII is presently inapplicable. More specifically, it would provide a cause of
action for plaintiffs not presently included under Title VII, such as victims of bisexual
harassment and victims in a single-sex environment. Finally, the proposed legislation
would end the distortion of Title VII, thereby returning Title VII's emphasis to
legitimate gender issues.
Id.
197. Particularly if one believes that Congress, ought to define sexual harassment rather
than leaving that job to courts and the E.E.O.C.
198. Levitsky supra note 11, at 1045.
199. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 107 (1987) (arguing that sexual

harassment both expresses and reinforces the social inequality of women to men).
200. Levitsky, supra note 11, at 1040.
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reminds her that she is a woman trespassing in a man's world; sexual harassment
subordinates women by penalizing them for crossing gender boundaries. Male victims of

sexual harassment in these cases are victims of a 'system of gender domination whose
principle effect is to subordinate women.' When a person sexually harasses a man, the
harasser both feminizes him and reinforces the idea that those qualities associated with
women are subordinate to the qualities associated with men. 201

For instance, often male-on-male sexual harassment is inflicted on
20 2
men perceived to be "effeminate."
Levitsky argues that the traditional comparative Title VII
analysis should be replaced with the dominance analysis. 20 3 Where the
comparative analysis asks whether the victim would have suffered the
disadvantageous terms or conditions if she were a member of the
opposite gender, the dominance analysis asks whether the egregious
conduct reinforced sex stereotypes that operate to preserve gender
hierarchy within the- workplace. 20 4 She goes on to argue that the
"equal opportunity harasser, like all ... who harass, reinforces the
sexual hierarchy by taking advantage of the sex object stereotype. The
dominance analysis holds individuals liable for any harassment based
on gender or gender stereotypes that reinforces this sexual hierarchy,
'20 5
regardless of the sex or sexual orientation of the victims.
While Levitsky's approach is analytically sound and wellfounded in MacKinnon's work, it may be too ambitious in that it
demands a fundamental overhaul of the theoretical basis of sexual
harassment law. Moreover, MacKinnon developed the fundamentals of
this perspective over twenty years ago and it has yet to take hold in
the majority of courts. Indeed, MacKinnon's amicus brief for Oncale
argued along these lines in favor of liability for same-sex
harassment. 20 6 While the Court did allow liability in that case, Justice
Scalia's majority opinion bears little resemblance to MacKinnon's
dominance theory. 20 7 Instead, the opinion stayed squarely in line with
the comparative approach. 20 8 Since it is unlikely that the Supreme
Court will adopt a radical feminist approach like MacKinnon's in the
201. Id. (citing PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE,
CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT 69 (1990); BARBARA A. GUTEK, SEX AND
THE WORKPLACE 10 (1985)).

202. Id. at 1041.
203. Id. at 1038-44.
204. See id.
205. Id. at 1044.
206. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 96-568, Amici
CuriaeBrief in Support of Petitioner,8 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 9, 30-32 (1997).
207. Compare Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80-82 (1998), with
MacKinnon, supra note 206, at 17-22.
208. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80-82.

2002]

"EQUAL OPPORTUNITY"SEXUAL HARASSER

1235

near future, it would appear that equal opportunity harassers will
remain free from liability unless a theory of liability is devised that is
reconcilable with the comparative approach.
IV. WHY EVEN BONA FIDE EQUAL OPPORTUNITY HARASSMENT IS
DISCRIMINATION "BECAUSE OF... SEX"
Using Oncale and the text of Title VII as a basis, it is clear that
"harassment" is nothing more than a proxy for acts that create "hostile
or abusive conditions of employment," and if those acts impose hostile
conditions on one sex, but not on the other, those acts constitute sex
discrimination. 20 9 Therefore, if equal opportunity harassment imposes
different disadvantageous conditions of employment on both male and
female victims, it follows that equal opportunity harassment
discriminates on the basis of sex. If the conditions of employment are
viewed from the perspective of the gender-specific reasonable victim,
as the Harris-Oncalesynthesis seems to dictate, 210 it should be clear
that equal opportunity harassment may well impose differently
disadvantageous conditions of employment on women than men, and
perhaps vice-versa. Thus, equal opportunity harassment may violate
Title VII under a disparate impact analysis, even if it does not violate
it under the more traditional disparate treatment analysis. 2 11
A. DisparateImpact Under Title VII
The 1991 Civil Rights Act amended Title VII to statutorily
codify employees' rights to be free from disparate impact
discrimination. 212 Essentially, an employment practice violates Title
VII's disparate impact prohibition if: (1) it causes' a disparate impact
on the basis of race, sex, etc., and (2) the employer cannot demonstrate
that the practice in question is job-related for the plaintiffs position
and consistent with business necessity. 21 3 Of course, in the sexual
209. "The critical issue, Title VII's text indicates, is whether members of one sex are exposed
to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not
exposed." Id. at 80 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring)).
210. Discussed supra at notes 26-38, and accompanying text.
211. Discussed supra at notes 121-142, and accompanying text.
212. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq. (1991).
213. Id. at § 2000(e)-2(k).
An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established under
[Title VII] only if ... a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a
particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race,
color religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the
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harassment context an additional element would be that the
employment practice is so objectively abusive that it constitutes a
condition of employment 214 -or, perhaps more appropriately, an
employment practice. 215 Clearly, sexual harassment is not job-related
or consistent with business necessity. Therefore, objectively abusive
equal opportunity harassment should constitute sex discrimination
violating Title VII if the plaintiffs can show a disparate impact based
on sex.
1. Use of the Reasonable Victim Standard to Determine Disparate
Impact
The HarrisCourt commands that analysis of the "conditions of
employment" take the victim's perspective into account. 216 In defining
the standard for when harassment has altered the conditions of
employment, the Court indicated that "all the circumstances" must be
taken into account, including whether the conduct is threatening,
offensive, or humiliating, whether it unreasonably interferes with the
employee's work performance, and what the effect is on the employee's
psychological
well-being. 21 7 These circumstances
cannot
be
meaningfully analyzed without consideration of the employee's
perspective. Thus, because the employee's perspective is used to
determine the conditions of employment, whether the conditions of
employment vary from one employee to another depends in part on the
employees' perspectives. As discussed earlier, this perspective includes
218
the employee's gender.
2. The Method of Compartmentalizing Qualitatively Different Impacts
Recall that "compartmentalization" is the analytical practice of
isolating a particular kind of objectionable policy or practice for
analysis. 21 9 For instance, an employer who subjects only female
employees to unwelcome sexual advances and who assigns only men to
the least desirable work stations would undoubtedly expose his
challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with
business necessity.
Id.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq. (1991).
Id. at 21-22.
Id. at 23.
Discussed supra at notes 26-38, and accompanying text.
Calleros, supra note 11, at 72.
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employer to liability under Title VII for either or both practices. 220
Professor Calleros indicated that a court would find that women had
been discriminated against with respect to one element of working
conditions, unwelcome sexual advances, and that men had been
discriminated against with respect to another, undesirable work
stations. 221 He further noted that some degree of judicial
compartmentalization is necessary because, as in the above
hypothetical, it would be "unseemly, if not impossible, [to inquire] into
the degree of undesirability of a male-only work station [as opposed] to
the qualitatively distinct burden suffered by women exposed to
'' 222
unwelcome sexual advances.
By combining this compartmentalization principle with a
disparate impact analysis, the resulting new model looks to whether
there are compartmentalizable, qualitatively different disparate
impacts imposed on women than on men when both genders are
subjected to sexual harassment.
B. Equal Opportunity HarassmentWill Often Violate Female Victims'
Title VII Rights
Under this model of applying Title VII, one must therefore
consider whether Supervisor Fred, though harassing Ken and Carol in
exactly the same manner, will nonetheless impose differently
disadvantageous conditions of employment on each, because of their
sexes, when he repeatedly asks them "How about some sex today?" Or,
to make it absolutely clear that he is demanding the same thing from
each of them, if he repeatedly asks, "How about some sodomy today?"
Will such unwanted sexual attention result in qualitatively different
disparate impacts?
Psychological evidence suggests that the reasonable woman is
far more offended by unwanted sexual attention than is the
reasonable man. 223 Unwanted workplace sexual advances from a man
have been found to be only "slightly upsetting" to most men, but
220. Id.
221. Id. at 72-73.
222. Id. at 73.
223. C. Waldo, J. L. Berdahl & L. F. Fitzgerald, Are Men Sexually Harassed? If So, by
Whom? 22 LAw & HUM. BEHAV., 59-79 (1998) (hereinafter "Are Men Sexually Harassed'); C.
Waldo, J. L. Berdahl & L. F. Fitzgerald, Sexual Harassment of Men? 20 PSYCHOL. OF WOMEN Q.
527-47 (1996) (hereinafter "Sexual Harassment of Men?'). 'Iuch of what women call sexual
harassment is not unwelcome or threatening when experienced by men, and . . . the
consequences are not as damaging for men as they are for women." Sexual Harassmentof Men?,
supra at 543.
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"extremely upsetting" to most women. 224 Of course, if unwanted sexual
advances are severe and pervasive enough, the reasonable man will
eventually experience severe distress. But, one can logically infer from
the above findings that as the pervasiveness and severity of unwanted
sexual advances increases, the reasonable woman would continue to
be more severely distressed than the reasonable man. Therefore,
because bona fide equal opportunity harassment imposes a
significantly disparate impact on the reasonable woman, it
discriminates against female victims in the conditions of
employment. 225 Returning to the ongoing hypothetical, Carol therefore
should be able to sue Supervisor Fred for imposing a sex-based
disparate impact in her conditions of employment.

C. Equal Opportunity Harassment May also Violate Male Victims'
Title VII Rights
Because the reasonable man generally suffers less from
unwanted sexual advances than does the reasonable woman, 226 to
show a disparate impact violation Ken must prove that Fred's
advances imposed a qualitatively different impact on him; an impact
that the reasonable man, but not the reasonable woman, would view
as a disadvantageous condition of employment. This Note asserts that
Ken's best option is to argue that male-male sexual harassment
threatens the reasonable man's cultural gender-status, while malefemale harassment does not threaten the reasonable woman's genderstatus. According to Catharine MacKinnon, male-male harassment
makes the target "inferior as a man by social standards ... for a man
to be attacked, placing him in a woman's role, demeans his
masculinity; he loses it, so to speak. This cannot be done to a
woman. 227 Thus because our society assigns the role of sexual
dominator to males and sexual dominatee to females, unwanted
sexual advances attack the reasonable man's hold on his gender-role,
while they simply reinforce the reasonable woman's gender role. This
may lead to a further burden for the reasonable male victim in that he
must perform dominating acts in order to consolidate his hold on

224. Are Men Sexually Harassed?,supra note 223, at 71, 74; Sexual Harassment of Men?,
supra note 223, at 537.
225. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2001)..
226. Discussed infra at Part IV.B.
227. MacKinnon, supra note 206, at 19-20.
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masculinity. Additionally, some heterosexual men subjected to malemale sexual advances may experience confusion as to their sexual
orientation and additional shame as a result. 228 The reasonable
woman, however would not experience these burdens when harassed
by a man.
Having shown that Fred's advances burden Ken in a way that
they do not burden Carol, the remaining question is whether this
disparate burden is sufficiently severe to constitute a disadvantageous
condition of employment. While jurors must ultimately determine this
on a case-by-case basis, interpretation of psychological literature
suggests an affirmative answer to this question. 229 The studies
indicate that harassment of the kind that enforces men's traditional
heterosexual gender role, such as ridiculing men for acting
effeminately or pressuring men to engage in stereotypical forms of
masculine behavior, is "upsetting" to most men. 230 In a situation in
which unwanted sexual advances are sufficiently severe and pervasive
to call the reasonable man's traditional gender-role into question in
the manner that MacKinnon describes, he would therefore likely
experience gender-role anxiety, as at least "upsetting," and potentially
"extremely upsetting," such that gender-role anxiety would constitute
23 1
a disadvantageous condition of employment.
Thus, under disparate impact analysis, Fred's conduct, if
sufficiently severe, should result in liability for actions directed
towards both Ken and Carol. One might argue that because Fred's
demands were not really motivated by Ken's or Carol's gender, he
should not be liable for discrimination. 232 This argument fails,
however, because Fred's motivation is irrelevant to disparate impact
analysis. Title VII is not a fault-based tort scheme, but rather focuses

228. While it is uncertain as to whether male sexual harassment of men can bring on such a
reaction, male rape of males has been shown to do so. See MICHAEL SCARCE, MALE ON MALE
RAPE 57-65 (1st ed. 1997). For instance, heterosexual males raped by other males often
experience erections and sometimes even ejaculate; such experiences then lead them to doubt
their sexuality afterward. See id.
229. Are Men Sexually Harassed?, supra note 223, at 59-79; Sexual Harassment of Men?,
supra note 223, at 527-47 'Much of what women call sexual harassment is not unwelcome or
threatening when experienced by men, and ... the consequences are not as damaging for men
as they are for women." Id. at 543.
230. Are Men Sexually Harassed?,supra note 223, at 61.
231. Of course, other psychological effects suffered by males at the hands of male harassers
may come to light with further study. This Note does not mean to imply that it has exhausted
the possibilities, simply that it has ascertained a potential discriminatory effect that is based on
the maleness of the victim in an equal opportunity harassment context.
232. See infra Part II.B.2.
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on the consequences of employment practices. 233 Neither the 1991
Civil Rights Act nor the Oncale Court's recent interpretation of Title
2 34
VII requires a discriminatory motive in disparate impact cases.
Oncale reiterated that "the critical issue ... is whether members of
one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of
'23 5
employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed.
Hence, the harasser's motivation is simply irrelevant to a Title VII
disparate impact claim.
Thus, under this view of Title VII, one finds that equal
opportunity harassment of sufficient severity would often result in
finding liability against those who harass females and, perhaps,
sometimes result in finding liability against those who harass males.
D. The "EmpatheticWhite Male" Expanded Standing Theory in the
Service of Combating Equal Opportunity Harassment
Many courts have held that members outside the
discriminated-against class may sue discriminating employers even
236
though the discrimination was not directed toward them personally.
The basic theory behind this expansion of standing is that the
congressional intent of Title VII may have been to eliminate
prudential standing requirements for such causes of action and to
allow any person sufficiently aggrieved to meet the Article III "case or
controversy" requirement to be able to sue. 237 For instance, if an
employer creates a work environment that is hostile to women, male
employees may sue under Title VII by alleging that they are injured
by the loss of their right to an environment free from gender
discrimination. 238 Some circuits have denied such standing, but one of
the main rationales supporting that decision was the now-defunct rule

233. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 880 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 432 (1971); Rogers v. E.E.O.C., 454 F.2d 234, 239 (5th Cir. 1971)).
234. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq. (1991); Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80-82 (1998).
235. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring)).
236. N. Morrison Torrey, Indirect Discrimination Under Title VII: Expanding Male Standing
To Sue For Injuries Received As A Result Of Employer Discrimination Against Females, 64
WASH. L. REV. 365, 383-84 (1989); Laura M. Jordan, Note, The Empathetic, White Male: An
Aggrieved Person Under Title VII?, 55 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 135, 145-50 (1999).
237. U.S. CONST. art. III. "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, [and) the Laws of the United States." Id.
238. Torrey, supra note 236, at 378. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65
(1986).
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against same-sex sexual harassment suits.239 Federal circuit courts of
appeal that have denied direct liability for same-sex harassment have
reasoned that males should not be able to "end run" the standing
barrier by suing based on harassment against their female
colleagues. 240 Because Oncale has overruled those federal circuits that
rejected same-sex sexual harassment suits, the rationale for denying
241
third-party standing has disappeared.
Hence, it would seem that in many federal circuits, at a
minimum the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and the District of
Columbia, 242 male victims of equal opportunity harassment may be
able to sue because of the already-established psychologically
disparate impact that such harassment has on their female colleagues.
By focusing both male and female plaintiffs' efforts on proving the
discriminatory effect on women, plaintiffs should be able to overcome
the argument that neither sex is discriminated against. Having
established the misogynist work environment, the male victims would
simply allege the loss of. a gender-equal work environment, and both
they and their female colleagues should have viable Title VII claims.
Thus, in federal circuits with liberal standing requirements, male
victims of harassment can choose between the earlier explored
disparate impact theory of qualitatively different psychological effects
being suffered by both men and women and this somewhat simpler,
though perhaps not as controversial, theory of focusing exclusively on
the more severe general psychological damage inflicted on female
victims through equal opportunity harassment.
V. CONCLUSION
This Note has endeavored to prove that equal opportunity
sexual harassment can and does result in members of 'one sex being
exposed to disadvantageous conditions of employment to which
members of the other sex are not. When there is differentiation in the
mode of harassment based on the victim's gender, plaintiffs should
have a disparate treatment cause of action; when there is bona fide
239. Jordan, supra note 236, at 150.
240. Id.
241. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79-80.
242. Clayton v. White Hall School Dist., 778 F.2d 457 (8th Cir. 1985); Stewart v. Hannon,
675 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1982); EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981); EEOC v. Bailey Co., 563 F.2d 439 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 915 (1978); Gray v. Greyhound Lines, E., 545 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Waters v. Heublein,
Inc., 547 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 915 (1977); Torrey, supra note 236, at
378-80.

1242

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:1205

equal harassment, plaintiffs should often have a disparate impact
and/or third-party standing cause of action. Implementing this
analysis in future Title VII cases should effectively eliminate the
categorical equal opportunity harassment exception without deviating
from the text or basic anti-discrimination purpose of Title VII.
Kyle F. Mothershead*
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